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Abstract: Many countries, including Italy, are increasingly managing their public 
higher education systems in accordance with the New Public Management principle that 
private-sector management practices improve efficiency and quality. A key mechanism 
has been the introduction of performance-based funding systems designed to reward 
‘high-performing’ institutions and to incentivise ‘lesser-performing’ institutions to 
improve. Instead of improving efficiency and quality across the board, however, we 
argue that performance-based university funding systems naturalise longstanding 
structurally-determined inequalities between institutions. They do so by recasting 
national higher education systems as competitive institutional meritocracies in which 
differences between institutions rooted in wider structural inequalities are redefined as 
objective markers of intrinsic institutional worth or ‘merit’. We illustrate how 
performance based university funding systems naturalise pre-existing inequalities 
between universities drawing on the case of Italy, a country characterised by 
longstanding inequalities between its Northern and Southern regions, which 
demonstrably impact on the apparent ‘performance’ of universities.  
 
Keywords: Higher Education; Performance-based funding; New Public Management; 
University evaluation; Meritocracy 
  
Introduction 
In recent decades many countries with high participation higher education systems 
(Marginson 2016) including Italy have increasingly sought to manage their universities 
and other public sector institutions in accordance with the principles of New Public 
Management (Lane 2000; Broucker and De Wit 2015). First emerging in the late 1970s 
as part of a neo-liberal economic approach to policy-making known as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Williamson 1993), the New Public Management  approach (hereafter 
NPM) represents a paradigmatic shift away from the notion of public sector 
management as “a process through which policies were formulated, resources allocated, 
and programs implemented” towards a vision of public sector management being “a 
policy issue in its own right” (Barzelay 2001, 1). Proponents of the NPM approach 
argue that private sector management practices are required in order to maximise the 
efficiency and quality of public sector institutions (Ferlie 1996; Lane 2000). With basic 
mottos such as “more market, less regulation, and strong leadership” (Schimank 2005, 
362), the NPM approach sets out to create ‘quasi-markets’ in public service provision 
with a clear emphasis on “securing value for money, [based] on the use of comparative 
performance indicators” (Ferlie 1996, 6). 
 
In the case of the management and funding of public sector universities, the latter has 
been embodied, inter alia, in the development of various evaluation-based funding 
mechanisms informed by so-called ‘performance’ indicators and underpinned by a 
“more contractual-oriented vision of how to support research” (Geuna 2001, 607; Turri 
2016). This market-like approach to the allocation of resources has been presented as a 
means of providing greater accountability and of solving the problem of chronic 
underfunding (Geuna and Martin 2003; OECD 1997). It entails measuring the 
comparative ‘performance’ of individual institutions and distributing resources 
disproportionately to those that ‘perform’ the best. A key component of the rationale for 
performance-based university funding is that promoting competition for resources 
among institutions drives up efficiency and quality across the system, including by 
incentivising lesser-performing institutions to improve (Herbst 2007, 18:90; in Hicks 
2012, 253). 
 
In this paper, we make use of the Italian case to argue that the introduction of 
performance-based funding for universities can be usefully understood as a mechanism 
for promoting ‘institutional meritocracy’. Intended to replace the mid-twentieth century 
model of higher education as a unitary system in which institutions enjoyed at least 
nominal parity of esteem (Moscati 2009, 214; Triventi and Trivellato 2009), the new 
‘institutional meritocracy’ model of higher education presupposes both the inevitability 
and the desirability of a vertically stratified higher education system in which 
institutions are positioned according to their worth or ‘merit’. Institutional ‘merit’, 
according to this model, is considered to be objectively measureable, and to be an 
intrinsic property of the individual institution concerned (Amsler and Bolsmann 
2012).The influence of wider social structures on ‘merit’, besides ‘incentives’, go 
unacknowledged or are notably downplayed, and the responsibility for good or bad 
‘performance’ against efficiency and quality measures is deemed to lie squarely with 
individual institutions.  
 
Our conceptualisation of performance-based university funding as part of a drive 
towards ‘institutional meritocracy’ builds on Pierre Bourdieu’s account of how 
meritocratic ideology is used to legitimate social reproduction via education at the 
individual level (Bourdieu 1974; Bourdieu 1977). For Bourdieu, the grading and 
certifying functions of contemporary educational institutions are designed to stratify 
individuals, rather than to ensure a common high standard for all, by rewarding qualities 
and capabilities that the education system itself does not cultivate, but which the 
already-advantaged disproportionately possess (Bourdieu 1977). Through the 
apparently objective assessment of individual ‘merit’ conceived of as innate ability, the 
determining influence of pre-existing social inequalities on the educational outcomes of 
individuals is not only obscured by the education system but is simultaneously rendered 
legitimate (Brown et al. 2014). As Bourdieu puts it: “a social gift [is] treated as a natural 
one" (Bourdieu 1974, 32). 
 
The hierarchical positioning of universities by means of performance-based funding and 
related competition measures can be viewed in the same light, as serving to render 
social gifts natural ones. The ideology of institutional meritocracy disguises the fact that 
the ‘performance’ of institutions, like that of individuals, depends heavily on pre-
existing stocks of economic, cultural and social ‘capital’. Those institutions, like those 
individuals, with more economic capital (e.g. greater income and wealth), more cultural 
capital (e.g. greater engagement in prestigious activities), and more social capital (e.g. 
stronger connections with social elites) tend to win ‘performance’ competitions which 
reward these kinds of capitals as though they were achieved rather than ascribed 
characteristics.  
 
The drive towards institutional meritocracy thus recasts higher education systems as 
competitive ‘fields’ in which institutions are positioned in relation to one another and 
are engaged in strategies of position-taking both nationally (Bourdieu 1993; Naidoo 
2004) and increasingly globally (Marginson 2008). The capacity of institutions to 
engage effectively in ‘elite’ position taking rests substantially on their comparative 
‘autonomy’, and the valorisation of that which autonomy is required to pursue. The 
selection of students, for example, or the privileging of research over the teaching 
function of the institution, require a degree of autonomy which is largely (if not 
exclusively) the preserve of capital-rich institutions (ibid.). 
 
Numerous examples of the inner workings of ‘institutional meritocracy’ within the field 
of higher education exist in the literature. Naidoo (2004), building on Bourdieu, 
analyses the ways in which South African universities have drawn on different capitals 
to position themselves within the national higher education field. Naidoo describes the 
development of a three-tiered system in South Africa, comprising a dominant tier of 
English-medium research intensive universities offering prestigious programmes 
exclusively to white British-ancestry students; an intermediate tier of Afrikaans-medium 
universities serving the white Afrikaans community; and a subordinate tier of less well 
resourced, largely teaching-only universities set up to provide black South African 
groups with higher education qualifications at sub-degree level. Here the capitals at play 
are economic, relating to levels of resource; cultural, relating to degree of engagement 
in research and in prestigious programme delivery; and social, marked by exclusionary 
associations with linguistic and racial/ethnic ‘elites’. The markedly uneven distribution 
of these capitals across South African universities is clearly a product of the vast 
structural inequalities created by colonialism, apartheid and their legacies, rather than 
their intrinsic worth. 
 
A similar kind of conversion of institutional capitals into ‘performance’ positions is also 
evident in the UK. Although not drawing explicitly on Bourdieu, Boliver (2015) 
demonstrates that the generally higher status of ‘old’ (pre-1992) and ‘new’ (post-1992) 
universities, and the especially high status of the ancient universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge, is driven by their higher economic capital, not least their endowment 
wealth; greater cultural capital, as represented by research intensity, research ‘quality’, 
and academic selectivity in student admissions; and stronger social capital, evident in 
the socioeconomically privileged backgrounds of their student bodies. As with the 
three-tiered system of universities in South Africa, the uneven distribution of capitals 
across ancient, old and new universities in the UK, and the corresponding stratification 
of institutions in terms of apparent ‘performance’, is the result of structural inequality 
rather than intrinsic ‘merit’, in this case the legacy of the timing and purpose of their 
foundation.  
 
This paper focuses on the Italian higher education system as a further example of the 
illusion of institutional meritocracy in higher education, in this case fostered by the 
relatively recent introduction of performance based university mechanisms and 
associated NPM strategies (discussed in more detail below). In the Italian case, the 
uneven distribution of capitals across universities stems from structural inequalities that 
are largely regional in nature, reflecting the deep and longstanding socioeconomic 
divide between the Northern and Southern regions of Italy. 
 
Historically and in the present day, the Italian South has a starkly lower level of 
economic productivity, a significantly higher unemployment rate, and much lower 
levels of research and development investment than its Northern and Central 
counterparts. The Italian South and the Islands (together known as the Mezzogiornio) 
had, in 2015, a GDP per capita of 18,100 and 17,800 euros respectively, compared to 
32,300 and 33,300 for the North-East and the North-West respectively. In terms of 
unemployment, both the South and the Islands had unemployment rates of 20% among 
those aged 20 to 64 in 2015, compared to just 6.7% for the North-East and 8% for the 
North-West. Moreover, according to Eurostat, research and development investment 
(including government, higher education, business enterprise sector and private non-for 
profit sector) per capita in the South was, in 2014, less than half (190 euros per 
inhabitant) of that in the North-West (502) and the North East (448.7). 
 
Given these stark socioeconomic inequalities between the North and South, it would not 
be surprising to find that universities located in the Northern and Southern regions differ 
substantially in terms of their economic, cultural and social capital stocks. Southern 
universities will inevitably tend to fare badly on common ‘performance’ metrics such as 
average time to graduation, which will be lengthened for students from relatively 
deprived local populations who need to combine study with work, and graduate labour 
market outcomes, which will be poorer for graduates seeking work in a comparatively 
under-developed local economy (SVIMEZ 2009; Bagues, Labini, and Zynovyeva 
2008). Likewise, Southern universities are likely to fare less well than Northern 
universities on ‘performance’ metrics relating to research intensity and quality, given 
low levels of R&D investment in the region. 
 
In this article, we demonstrate empirically for the Italian case that there is a fundamental 
contradiction between the creation of an institutional meritocracy and the existence of 
structural inequalities that shape the performance of institutions as measured against 
what are regarded as indicators of merit. Focusing on the kinds of metrics used to 
determine performance based funding of universities in Italy, we show that these 
metrics are tightly associated with the regions in which universities are located, with 
institutions located in the prosperous North showing a higher performance than those 
located in the comparatively under-developed South. Before proceeding to this 
empirical analysis, we turn next to an analysis of the emergence of performance based 
university funding in Italy which has been a key driver towards institutional 
meritocracy. 
 
The Italian University System: Funding Strategies and the NPM Paradigm 
Until the 1990s, the organisation and funding of Italian higher education was delivered 
in a heavily centralised fashion (Boffo and Moscati 1998; Moscati 2009); for instance, 
establishing or altering a university degree could only be done through a ministerial 
decree (Luzzatto and Moscati 2005). This centralisation was especially evident in the 
provision of funds to universities, with university budgets characterised by firm 
itemisation and funds allocated strictly according to each budget item (Boffo and 
Moscati 1998, 353). In 1993, however, a new funding mechanism was introduced, 
which scrapped the itemisation of university funds in order to “a) increase the level of 
funding and administrative autonomy of universities and b) allocate an increasing quota 
of public resources not on a historical basis but on a rewarding model” (Geuna and 
Labini 2013, 2).  
 
This shift in funding arrangements was consistent with various other changes in the 
organisation and management of higher education systems in Italy, Europe, and 
globally, which share core elements of the NPM paradigm. In Italy as elsewhere, 
universities since the 1990s have been encouraged to tighten their links with non-
university sectors, including offering commercial services; their research and teaching 
activities began to be more closely scrutinised; and there was a “drive to establish a 
“brand name” for each university (in order to make individual institutions more 
attractive to prospective students, research customers and the like)” (Moscati, 2009, 
210). Among the champions of such reforms was the centre-left coalition government 
which came to power in 1996 and envisioned an Italian higher education system “in line 
with the standards of the most advanced European […] higher education systems”. The 
latter could only be achieved, the coalition government claimed, through ”a more 
entrepreneurial, quality-oriented, innovation and competition driven organizational 
model of university” and “strong decentralization”, with the State steering ”at a distance 
and evaluat[ing] universities’ performance” (Vaira 2003, 188). These reforms were 
further galvanised by the Bologna process, which ratified the Sorbonne agreement on 
the homogenisation of European higher education systems agreed by Italian, French, 
British and German ministers (Vaira, 2003; Mascoti, 2009).  
 
Against this backdrop, the Italian government has successively introduced new funding 
strategies that entail institutional competition – both in teaching and research – as a 
resource allocation strategy (Molin, Turri, and Agasisti 2017). Italy has followed the 
trend of other European countries of reducing the government’s block grant to 
universities (the Fondo di Finanziamento Ordinario or FFO) – from 61.3% in 2000 to 
56.1% in 2014 – replaced by an important increase in external contractual funding from 
10.1% to 16.3% of the total income of universities, as well as an increase in income 
from student fees (from 10.8% to 14.7%) (ANVUR 2016, 297). 
 
It is within the FFO block grant itself where the greatest changes have been made, 
particularly in the introduction of performance-based formulas to distribute an 
increasing share of it. The introduction of the FFO in 1993 encompasses perfectly the 
two main premises of the NPM paradigm: greater accountability and market-like 
allocation of resources (Lane 2000). According to Geuna and Labini (2013, 7), the FFO 
was created with three main objectives: 1) to grant greater autonomy to Italian public 
universities, both in terms of funding and administration; 2) to reduce the funding 
imbalances of higher education institutions regarding their standard costs, their inputs 
(students, staff, etc.) and their outputs (graduates, publications, etc.); and 3) to connect 
the allocation of public resources to the evaluation of research and teaching.  
 
The FFO funding flows are divided into three main components: a basic quota, a 
performance-based rewarding share, and a small portion destined to cover special legal 
dispositions. Since 2008, when a ministerial decree was passed stating that the 
performance-based rewarding share should not be less than 7 percent of the FFO, the 
portion allocated based on evaluation has increased up to 21.6% in 2015 (ANVUR 
2016). From this 21.6%, 65% was allocated according to the results of the Italian 
research evaluation exercise for the years 2004-2010 (known as VQR), 20% depending 
on the evaluation of institutional recruitment policies, 7% according to the number of 
students that have had an international exchange experience and the share of students 
with a secondary degree awarded in a foreign country, and 8% based on the share of 
students that have acquired at least 20 credits in the academic year 2013/2014.  
 
This competition milieu is transforming the Italian higher education system as a whole, 
which has been historically ‘not differentiated at all’ (Triventi and Trivellato 2009, 
683). While in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, vertical 
diversity – that is, the “inhomogeneities [sic] regarding reputation and prestige aspects 
in institutions” (Turri 2014, 7; see also Teichler 2008; Boliver 2015) is a central part of 
their higher education systems, this has not historically applied to the Italian higher 
education landscape. When social demand for higher education soared in the 1960s, 
consistent with European trends, the Italian government responded to it by 
implementing an ‘open-door system’, allowing school leavers from any secondary 
school track to enrol in Italian universities. Despite this, the Italian higher education 
system remained undifferentiated; institutions kept their comprehensive missions – 
undertaking both research and teaching activities – a model “justified by the need to 
grant degrees with legal value (with corresponding equal quality)” (Moscati 2009, 219). 
The main driver for not allowing the introduction of vocational tracks “was to avoid the 
creation of a hierarchy of institutions” (Moscati 2009, 221).  
 
The proliferation of performance-based funding mechanisms seems likely, as intended, 
to undo the historically undifferentiated nature of the Italian higher education system. It 
has already been demonstrated that the growing proportion of university funding 
coming from competitively awarded contractual funds is having an important regional 
impact, “with the universities of Northern Italy enjoying a share almost twice that of 
those in Central or Southern parts of the country” (Geuna et al. 2015, 116). In this paper 
we demonstrate empirically that the performance-related element of the FFO block 
grant evidences as similarly strong regional tinge, with a marked tendency for 
universities in the less developed South to place last in this competition. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
In this paper we use cluster analysis to create a typology of Italian universities based on 
their ‘performance’ against a series of indicators which purport to measure excellence in 
teaching provision and research production. Our hypothesis is that the types of 
institutions found the in data will correspond to a regional distribution, with ‘high 
performing’ institutions located overwhelmingly in the North and ‘low performing’ 
institutions overwhelmingly in the South. 
 
Our sampling units are publicly funded Italian universities (N=61) spread across 19 
constitutionally autonomous regions in Italy, and 5 macro regions.1  11 of Italy’s 
universities are located in the North-West, 11 in the North-East, 16 in the Centre, 5 in 
the Islands, and 18 in the Southern region of the country.  
 
Our indicators of institutional ‘performance’ include several publicly available metrics 
used to inform the performance-related funding component of the FFO block grant in 
Italy. To supplement this data, we also mined performance-related measures from the 
following sources: a) the Archivo del Personale Docente – the Italian Ministry of 
Instruction, Universities and Research (MIUR)’s data archive on universities’ human 
resources; b) the Anagrafe Nazionale Studenti – the statistics office on students run by 
the MIUR; c) data on the Italian Higher Education system provided by the ANVUR 
(2014); and d) the Web of Science SCImago ranking of universities. All the data 
corresponds to the academic year 2011-2012.   
 
In 2015, sixty-five percent of the performance-based element of university funding was 
based on a research evaluation exercise, the VQR 2004-2010, which involved the 
assessment of Italian institutions’ research quality, capacity to attract resources, the 
research quality of mobile researchers, the international mobility of researchers and the 
quality of research co-authored with international authors, the capacity to train PhDs 
and post-docs, the share of institutions’ own funding to fund research, and the 
improvement of research quality compared to the previous research evaluation exercise 
(ANVUR 2014, 529).  Informed by the above, we use the (1) SCImago Normalized 
Impact Score which measures the volume of publications and subsequent citations 
associated with each institution,2 (2) the percentage of publications written in 
collaboration with one or more researchers from foreign institutions3 and (3) the 
percentage of PhD students within the student body4. For the small number of cases 
                                                          
1 In this paper, we are using the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for statistics (NUTS) level 1 
classification, developed by the European Union. See [Accessed May 14 2017]: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/345175/7451602/nuts-map-IT.pdf  
2 This is an indicator developed by the Karolinska Institutet in Sweden which “gives an 
indication of the combined impact of the production volume and field normalized citation score 
of the analysed unit [university]” (Rehn et al. 2014, 10). In the indicators used in this paper, the 
Normalised Impact Score uses the publications published between the years 2005-2009, which 
in the context of this article the data has been collected from the report on the state of Italian 
research in 2013 (ANVUR 2014, 590). 
3 Data retrieved from ANVUR. 2014. Rapporto Sullo Stato Del Sistema Universitario E Della 
Ricerca 2013, p. 590. 
4 Data source: Anagrafe Nazionale Studenti as it appears in ANVUR. 2014. Rapporto Sullo 
Stato Del Sistema Universitario E Della Ricerca 2013. Rome: Agenzia Nationale di Valutazione 
del sistema Universitario e della Ricerca, p. 297-298. 
with missing values on one of more of these metrics (N=6), the sample mean value was 
used instead.  
 
A further eight percent of the performance-based element of university funding is based 
on institutional percentages of students obtaining at least 20 credits per academic year. 
As a proxy for this, we use (4) average number of credits acquired at undergraduate 
level and5 (5) average number of credits acquired at postgraduate level6, supplemented 
with data on (6) average time in years to graduation from a 3-year undergraduate degree 
programme6 and (7) student-staff ratio.7 
 
Our chosen method of data analysis, cluster analysis, uses algorithms based on matrix 
algebra methods to classify cases into types. This technique “help[s] to undercover any 
structure” in the data (Everitt et al. 2011, 9), producing classifications which are 
‘objective’ in the sense that the same data produces the same taxonomy regardless of 
the subjectivity of the researcher (Everitt et al. 2011; Byrne and Callaghan 2014). 
Cluster analysis is an inductive data analysis technique in which clusters “emerge out of 
the assortment of configurations of attributes associated with the whole case” (Everitt et 
al. 2011, 9). However, the classification produced by cluster analysis can subsequently 
be used deductively as a basis for testing a previously defined hypothesis about the 
nature of the structure of the data (Huberty, Jordan, and Brandt 2005). In this instance, 
the hypothesis is distinctive clusters of ‘higher performing’ Northern and ‘lower 
performing’ Southern universities will be emerge from the data. If this hypothesis is 
proven to be correct, it would indicate that a single standard of competition among 
Italian universities designed to reward high-performing institutions at the expense of 
poorer performing ones is serving to naturalise longstanding inequalities between 
regions in Italy. 
Results 
Four commonly used clustering algorithms are applied to our data, known as the 
between-groups, within-groups, nearest-neighbour and furthest-neighbour algorithms 
(Xu and Wunsch 2008). The clusters proceeds agglomeratively; that is, at the beginning 
of the process, each case constitutes its own cluster, and by the end of the process all 
cases are included the same cluster. In order to identify the optimal number of clusters 
identified by each algorithm, elbow plots are used to depict the percentage of 
dissimilarity between cases accounted for by N clusters (Madhulatha 2012). Reading 
these plots from left to right, the beginning of a marked downward trajectory in the 
plotted line, known as the ‘elbow point’ (Ketchen & Shook 1996), indicates the point at 
which a further reduction in the number of clusters begins to bring together highly 
dissimilar cases. Figure 1 shows the elbow plots for the four cluster algorithms used 
(elbow points are marked with a black square). 
 
                                                          
5 Data source: Anagrafe Nazionale Studenti as it appears in ANVUR. 2014. Rapporto Sullo 
Stato Del Sistema Universitario E Della Ricerca 2013. Rome: Agenzia Nationale di Valutazione 
del sistema Universitario e della Ricerca, p. 105. 
6 Data source: Anagrafe Nazionale Studenti as it appears in ANVUR. 2014. Rapporto Sullo 
Stato Del Sistema Universitario E Della Ricerca 2013. Rome: Agenzia Nationale di Valutazione 
del sistema Universitario e della Ricerca, p. 115. 
7 Data source: MIUR Ufficio di Statistica, link: http://ustat.miur.it/, [Data accessed: 10 August 
2017]. 
 
[Figure 1 near here. Caption: Figure 1. Elbow plots illustrating cluster solutions with a 
black square highlighting the elbow points] 
 
Elbow plot 1a shows that the between-groups algorithm produces two optimal clusters, 
but that these two clusters account for a very low percentage of the dissimilarity across 
individual institutions (11%). The within-groups algorithm produces a 3-cluster solution 
which accounts for a reasonably high degree of the dissimilarity (almost 40%) between 
cases (Elbow plot 1b). Plot 1c for the nearest neighbour algorithm presents a 3-cluster 
solution with 30% of the dissimilarity between cases accounted for by these three 
clusters. Finally, the furthest-neighbour algorithm offers a 4-cluster solution, as seen in 
elbow plot 1d; it also accounts for a high degree of the dissimilarity between cases 
(almost 60%) and so is our preferred model.  
 
Table 1 presents a contingency table for the NUTS1 Italian macro-regions and the 4-
cluster solution produced by the furthest neighbour algorithm.  As can be seen, the first 
cluster contains most of the Northern universities (17 out of 22) and no Southern 
universities. In contrast, cluster two contains most Southern universities (14 out of 18), 
most of the Islands universities (4 out of 5), and only one Northern university. Clusters 
three and four are smaller in size and are more mixed with respect to the regional 
location of institutions. While our preferred model is that produced by the furthest 
neighbour algorithm, it is worth nothing that the between-groups and within-groups 
algorithms evidence the same north-south regional divide. Only the nearest-neighbour 
algorithm fails to find a north-south divide, clustering all but two universities into one 
large category and two Southern universities into separate singleton clusters. 
 
Table 2 reports which universities are members of each cluster produced by the furthest 
neighbour algorithm. 
 
[Tables 1 and 2 near here] 
 
Table 3 reports the mean values of each variable in the cluster analysis for each of the 
four clusters. Comparing cluster 1, containing most of the Northern universities, to 
cluster 2, containing most of the Southern universities, it is clear that the former 
‘perform’ better on all seven measures. The mean values for Clusters 3 and 4, where 
most of the Central institutions are found, generally lie somewhere in between.  
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
Discussion and Conclusion: the Field of Higher Education as an ‘Institutional 
Meritocracy’ 
The results presented above show that there are indeed differentiated groups of Italian 
state universities. Specifically, these groups relate to the North/South divide, with the 
Italian Central macro-region showing intermediate values supporting the idea that the 
Italian Centre share characteristics of both North and South (Geuna et al. 2015). These 
findings demonstrate empirically that measures of the institutional performance of 
Italian universities in relation to what are commonly championed by NPM proponents 
as indicators of ‘merit’ map almost perfectly onto the historical macro-regional division 
between the North and the South of the country. Northern universities in Italy have 
substantially lower student-staff ratios; their students acquire more university credits 
and graduate more quickly; they educate more PhD students; and their research 
publications are more highly cited and more likely to be placed in internationally 
recognised outlets. This key finding indicates that measures of ‘performance’ capture 
structural inequalities between institutions, in this instance linked to regional location, 
rather than performance per se. Or to put it another way, the performance of institutions 
cannot be disentangled from their geographic location and its historical and 
contemporary economic condition.  
 
As noted earlier, the ostensible rationale behind performance-based funding is that it 
holds universities accountable for the quality of their teaching and research relative to 
other providers in the market and rewards or penalise institutions accordingly (Lane 
2000). However, our results suggest that differences in performance in measures of 
institutional ‘merit’ cannot be solely explained by the ‘talent’ of individual universities. 
The Italian university and research evaluation agency, ANVUR, claims that a university 
system that is regularly evaluated – and rewarded accordingly – “represents a virtuous 
model” that “pushes individual institutions to comply with qualitative criteria that are 
accepted internationally and defined transparently” (ANVUR 2016, 684-5). The latter 
understanding of institutional ‘merit’, dictated by the standards of a global competitive 
market, is comparable to the neoliberal view of education as meritocratic competition. 
As with meritocracy as it operates at the level of the individual, institutional 
meritocracy ‘disguises’ the privileges of institutions as a ‘gift of nature’. Performance-
based funding systems act as sorting mechanisms for institutions – as higher education 
does with students – selecting and/or classifying them against a “virtuous model” based 
on “quality standards” that are deemed “objective” (ANVUR 2016, 684). The concept 
of ‘institutional meritocracy’ captures how, in the context of the neoliberal university, 
institutional academic taxonomies are “organised according to the hierarchy of qualities 
commonly ascribed to the dominant group.” 
 
In the context of an institutional meritocracy based on standards dictated by global 
competition, the ‘logic proper to the system’ is shaped by global university league 
tables –such as the Times Higher Education ranking or the Academic Ranking of World 
Universities produced by Shanghai Ranking Consultancy, leading to the normalisation 
of the research-intensive university as the ‘virtuous’ institutional model (Van Vught and 
Ziegele 2011; Hazelkorn 2007; Marginson and van der Wende 2007; David 2016). Our 
results suggest that, in the case of Italy, the capacity of a given institution to match this 
‘virtuous’ model is a function of their regional environments. Thus, instead of 
improving efficiency and quality across the board, systems of institutional meritocracy 
translated into, inter alia, performance-based university funding systems serve to 
naturalise structurally-determined inequalities between institutions. 
 
The concept of institutional meritocracy developed in this paper advances existing 
Bourdieusian accounts of the nature and drivers of the growing vertical stratification of 
universities throughout the world. It does so by showing how Bourdieu’s critique of the 
illusion of meritocracy applies to institutions as well as individuals: in both cases, 
inequitable outcomes are misrepresented as the inevitable result of the playing-out of 
differences in intrinsic merit under conditions of fair competition (Bourdieu 1977). 
Bourdiesian scholars have highlighted the national and global higher education fields in 
which universities compete, and the ways in which institutional capitals largely 
predetermine successful position-taking within those fields (Naidoo 2004; Marginson 
2008). The concept of institutional meritocracy completes this account, by giving a 
name to the game being played. 
 The institutional meritocracy game, as with the game played at the level of the 
individual (cf. Young 1958), is highly problematic given what is now an axiomatic 
proposition of Bourdieu’s oeuvre: that ‘all statistical inquiries show that the social 
properties of agents, thus their dispositions, correspond to the social properties of the 
position they occupy’ (Bourdieu 1993, 165). Our empirical analysis shows that Italian 
institutions’ social properties in terms of their regional environments, which correlate 
strongly with the age of institutions, the social background of their students, and their 
capacity to attract resources, successfully explain inequalities within the Italian higher 
education field.  
 
Several decades of higher education policy-making have served to formalise and 
crystalize this differentiation within the Italian higher education system, making 
institutional hierarchies explicit, and naturalising power asymmetries within the 
national field. It is important to recognise, however, that these changes to the Italian 
national higher education system are a consequence of the emergence of a global ‘field 
of power’ (ibid., Marginson 2006) in higher education. This field of power is dominated 
by the US model of higher education, and to a lesser extent that of other Anglo-Saxon 
countries such as the UK, which has captured ‘policy imagination everywhere [via] a 
selective reading of US practices’ (Marginson 2008, 310). In many countries, we find 
practices that seek to emulate the structural features of this hegemonic model, 
consisting of a highly hierarchised system with a wide range of institutional types, a 
strong sense of competition for the brightest students and academics, and a premium 
placed on research performance and influence, to name a few of its features.  
 
The dominance of this model in the field of global higher education has driven policy-
makers and university officials to pursue a range of national and institutional strategies 
for ‘positon-taking’ (cf. Brankovic 2018). In Italy, playing the game of institutional 
meritocracy through the use of performance-based funding mechanisms seems to be 
regarded as the only way to successfully position Italian universities within the global 
higher education field (ibid.). The Italian case is, of course, far from unique in its 
response to the global field of power. Institutional meritocracy would seem, to many, to 
be the only game in town. 
 
It is worth saying in closing that we acknowledge that the Italian government does not 
entirely fund universities based on performance. Italian universities receive region-
specific funding per student, as the Italian government recognises that students from 
different regions have, on average, unequal levels of income and thus different 
capacities to make contributions to their student fees (ANVUR 2016, 302). Moreover, 
the Italian government has introduced cushioning measures in the form of funding 
mechanisms that prevent universities from seeing their budgets reduced more than 2 
percent of what they received in the previous academic year. These measures clearly 
alleviate the funding deprivation that underperforming universities would otherwise 
suffer if funding models were purely competitive, and acknowledge at least to some 
extent that individual institutions never compete on a level playing field. However, we 
would contend that the introduction of these counterbalancing measures actually 
reinforce our argument that the establishment of a pure institutional meritocracy – one 
with no equalising or redistributive measures – would serve to naturalise and thereby 
legitimate structurally-determined inequalities between institutions, rather than, as 
claimed, improving efficiency and quality across the board.  
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Table 1. Contingency table for the furthest neighbour 4-cluster solution and the NUTS1 Italian 
Macro-regions. 
 
  
   Furthest neighbour clusters  
  1 2 3 4 Totals 
NUTS1 Macro-regions North-West 7 1 2 1 11 
 North-East 10 0 1 0 11 
 Centre 3 2 6 5 16 
 Islands 0 4 0 1 5 
 South 0 14 4 0 18 
 Totals 20 21 13 7 61 
Table 2. Cluster memberships of Italian universities for the furthest neighbour algorithm. 
 
Cluster 1 (N=20) 
‘Insubria’ Varese-Como 
‘IUAV’ Venezia 
Bologna 
Ferrara 
Milano 
Milano-Bicocca 
Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Padova 
Parma 
Pavia 
Perugia 
Piemonte Orientale 
Milano Politecnico 
Torino 
Trento 
Trieste 
Udine  
Verona 
Stranieri de Perugia 
Stranieri di Siena 
 
Cluster 2 (N=21) 
‘Magna Graecia’ Catanzaro 
Basilicata 
Brescia 
Cagliari 
Calabria 
Cassino e Lazio Meridionale 
Catania 
L’Aquila 
Messina 
Molise 
‘Federico II’ Napoli 
‘Mediterranea’ Reggio Calabria 
Foggia 
‘Seconda’ Napoli 
Palermo 
Pisa 
Bari Politecnico 
Salento 
Salerno 
Sannio di Benevento 
Teramo 
 
Cluster 3 (N=13) 
‘Carlo Bo’ Urbino 
‘G. d’Annunzio’ Chieti-
Pescara 
Bari 
‘Ca Foscari’ Venezia 
Bergamo 
Firenze 
Macerata 
Roma Tre 
Marche Politecnico 
‘L’Orientale’ Napoli 
‘Parthenope’ Napoli 
Torino Politecnico 
 ‘La Sapienza’ Roma 
 
Cluster 4 (N=7) 
‘Foro Italico’ Roma 
‘Tor Vergata’ Roma 
Camerino 
Genova 
Sassari 
Siena 
Tuscia 
 
 
Table 3. Mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) of each variable for the four clusters 
(furthest neighbour algorithm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               Furthest neighbour clusters 
  1 2 3 4 
SCImago normalized impact score 1.37 1.19 1.19 1.19 
 (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) 
% of publications with an international co-author 37.17 29.33 33.91 36.33 
 (4.70) (5.83) (4.72) (2.87) 
% PhD students within study body 2.38 1.56 1.85 3.50 
 (0.70) (0.35) (0.48) (0.72) 
Average number of undergraduate credits acquired 34.56 25.66 30.07 29.91 
 (3.33) (2.56) (3.14) (2.83) 
Average number of postgraduate credits acquired  38.21 31.90 35.73 35.17 
 (3.02) (3.51) (2.87) (2.36) 
Average number of years to graduation 4.59 5.65 5.09 5.35 
 (0.31) (0.45) (0.42) (0.55) 
Student/staff ratio 26.46 32.36 37.91 24.20 
 (4.6) (5.22) (7.19) (3.47) 
